

Greenwood Village Incident Review

AN ANALYSIS OF POLICE DECISIONS AND ACTIONS DURING A
BARRICADED SUSPECT OPERATION ON JUNE 3, 2015.

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THE NATIONAL TACTICAL OFFICER'S ASSOCIATION

Foreword

Greenwood Village Colorado is a peaceful, affluent community featuring a vibrant mix of modern business and upscale residential properties. On the afternoon of June 3, 2015, that peace was shattered for many residents when an armed criminal attempting to evade police officers from the nearby city of Aurora, ran into the city limits of Greenwood Village and barricaded himself in the residence of an uninvolved third party, where he then fired on responding officers.

The resulting barricaded suspect operation lasted approximately nineteen hours. When it concluded, the suspect had been taken into custody, alive and with very minimal injury sustained from police use of force. Neither were there any injuries sustained by law enforcement personnel or members of the public. Unfortunately, the residence in which the suspect took shelter sustained major damage as a result of the methods utilized by police in attempts to induce the suspect's surrender and ultimately achieve his arrest.

In the aftermath of the incident, the victim/owner of the home was understandably dismayed by the extensive damage to his residence. He met with members of the media, referring to the police tactical response as an "abomination and an atrocity." Command representatives of the Greenwood Village Police Department subsequently held their own press conference, stating that they had followed "textbook" procedures resulting in a resolution of the incident in which no one was killed or seriously injured.

This is an unusual incident for the Greenwood Village area, although it is certainly not unprecedented on a national level. It comes during a period of time in which American law enforcement is under great scrutiny, particularly with respect to issues relating to use of force, and the "militarization" of police tactics. Citizens and representatives of the media in the Greenwood Village area are seeking answers to the questions posed by this event. Were the actions of the police an abomination or were they textbook? Accordingly, Greenwood Village Chief of Police John A. Jackson commissioned this independent review of the incident through the National Tactical Officer's Association (NTOA).

The NTOA is the premier law enforcement professional organization with a specific focus on tactics and police response to critical incidents. The Association's primary goal is the enhancement of public safety through the elevation of professional standards within law enforcement. The NTOA has earned a longstanding reputation for critical, objective review and analysis of law enforcement special operations teams and their response to critical incidents.

While many aspects of the Greenwood Village Police Department's capability and response during this incident were reviewed, this document is not intended to serve as a comprehensive team review. Rather, the primary emphasis of this report will be on the police decisions and actions, which led to the arrest of the suspect as well as the extensive damage to the home.

Methodology and Reference Materials

The reviewers utilized several forms of inquiry and made use of many reference materials in evaluating this event. These forms of inquiry and reference include the following:

- A site visit to the incident and command post locations;
- Interviews and meetings with the Greenwood Village Police Department command staff and supervisors from SWAT, Crisis Negotiations Team and Dispatch;
- Interviews with command staff, supervisors or personnel who were involved in this incident from the following agencies:
 - Arapahoe County District Attorney's Office
 - Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office
 - Aurora Police Department
 - Douglas County Sheriff's Office
 - South Metro Fire Rescue Authority
- Reviews of the following materials:
 - Crime reports from this incident
 - GVPD Dispatch Incident Log;
 - Crime scene photographs;
 - Audio recordings of radio transmissions;
 - Police Department Policy

The reviewers wish to thank Chief Jackson and his staff for making every effort to provide the necessary personnel, case and policy materials required to properly evaluate this incident.

Incident Synopsis

Initial Response

On June 3, 2015 at approximately 1:43 pm, Greenwood Village police units were advised by their dispatch center that police officers from the city of Aurora were pursuing an armed suspect who was on foot in an area near Greenwood Village's northern border. Information received by Greenwood PD during those first minutes indicated that the suspect was originally wanted for theft but was now reported to be armed with a handgun, and that he may be trying to carjack a vehicle for his escape. The officers were also advised that at one point, the suspect was in a vehicle and had attempted to run down an Aurora police officer.

As law enforcement personnel from several agencies converged on the area, the suspect (later identified as Robert Johnathan Seacat) ran into a Greenwood Village residential area and entered a home at 4219 S. Alton Street. Seacat had no prior connection with the residence. At the time he entered, the residence was occupied by a nine-year-old boy who was fortunate to escape unharmed, as police officers established a perimeter around the home.

Fearing that Seacat may attempt to escape by stealing a car from the residence, officers began to block the driveway with police vehicles. As this maneuver was taking place, Seacat fired a weapon through the closed garage door, with the bullet striking the hood of one of the police vehicles and lodging itself in the firewall/dashboard area. Greenwood Village PD Commander Dustin Varney assumed incident command and deemed this to be a barricaded suspect incident. Commander Varney initiated barricaded suspect protocols including establishment of a field command post (CP), and activation of SWAT and Crisis Negotiations Team (CNT) assets. The eventual SWAT deployment consisted of personnel from both the Aurora and Greenwood Village Police Departments.

4219 S. Alton Street

The residence at 4219 S. Alton Street is a two-story home with over two thousand square feet of living space. There is also a basement with access from the rear of the property. Second floor windows provide a dominating view of any approach to the front door, and the rear yard (north side) of the property is directly adjacent to the 225 Freeway. When officers interviewed the homeowner, they learned that additional handguns, "hunting rifles," and ammunition were readily accessible within the residence.

Attempts at Negotiation

Within fifteen minutes of firing the first shot through the garage door, Seacat telephoned the police dispatch center and demanded to speak with the person in charge. Seacat's call was quickly routed to the CP and attempts to negotiate a peaceful surrender began in earnest. Within a short time, Seacat provided a false name of "Goeff," and asked to speak with his sister and a Catholic priest. As CNT personnel spoke with the suspect

and elicited details about his sister and mother, they were soon able to obtain enough information to deduce the actual identity of Seacat, who had an extensive history of narcotics and weapons violations. All contact with Seacat during this incident was through his cell phone.

As the afternoon passed, continuing attempts were made to convince Seacat to surrender. Seacat's sister was located in the city of Boulder, and police personnel from the Boulder and Greenwood Village Police Departments expedited her transportation to the CP. Shortly after 5:00 pm, a recorded message from Seacat's wife was played from a public address system. Negotiations continued with Seacat, but just after 6:00 pm he hung up on negotiators and contact was never re-established. Shortly thereafter, Seacat's cell phone service was cut off at the direction of the CP, and a CNT throw phone was inserted into the residence in hopes of re-establishing contact. As evening fell, recorded messages from both Seacat's sister and his wife were played via public address system. The recorded messages implored Seacat to surrender. Unfortunately, they had no effect.

Up until the time that CNT lost contact with Seacat, the negotiations were characterized as "reasonably positive." Unbeknownst to law enforcement was the fact that Seacat was not only actively using methamphetamine, but he had also swallowed containers of the substance, which were now leaking into his system. One can only speculate as to the effect this had on Seacat's ability to think rationally, and to what degree the drug minimized the effects of any chemical munitions, which were later introduced.

Attempts to establish contact with Seacat via throw-phone and public address announcements continued throughout the entire evening, even as chemical agents were deployed and explosive breach techniques were employed.

Escalation of Tactical Alternatives

Shortly after 7:00 pm, nearly five hours after Seacat fired his first shot, the first chemical munitions were introduced into the residence. Over the next two hours, a variety of chemical munitions (CS and OC) were fired through windows into the residence, and several doors were breached with explosives or by mechanical means. None of these measures induced Seacat to surrender or respond in any way.

Given the failure of negotiations and chemical munitions to induce surrender, or to even develop a dialogue with the suspect, a plan was devised for SWAT personnel to enter the residence through the basement and slowly clear each floor upward until the suspect was located.

At approximately 10:30 pm, an entry team of Greenwood Village SWAT personnel entered the basement and began clearing upward through the interior of the residence. The entry team intended to utilize robotics to clear areas ahead of them, however the robots had difficulty maneuvering through debris within the home. At one point, a robot became stuck on the stairs leading to the second (upstairs) floor. Team members

devised a plan to recover the robot. The plan called for a team member to deploy a flash-sound diversionary device (flash-bang) onto the upstairs landing to create a diversion while other members advanced and recovered the robot. Unfortunately, the device struck a railing and fell back onto the team's position where it deflagrated. Seacat immediately began firing from a position on the second floor. Entry team personnel believed that Seacat was firing through the floor toward their position, so a decision was made to fall back and evacuate the residence.

Over the next few hours, attempts were made to introduce additional chemical munitions and to clear sight lines for marksmen and containment personnel. At one point, launch able flash-bangs were utilized to remove a sliding door. Throughout the night, SWAT personnel continued to make announcements from a public address system in an effort to initiate a dialogue with Seacat or to induce his surrender.

As the night waned, frustration and fatigue became inevitable factors to deal with. Greenwood Village and Aurora SWAT personnel had been on station for over twelve hours, many of who had been working several hours before that time. Chief Jackson made the decision to relieve the containment and entry personnel, however overall command of the incident would remain with Commander Varney. SWAT personnel from the Arapahoe and Douglas County Sheriff Offices were requested to respond and provide relief. It would be nearly 6:00 am, before that relief was completed.

Calculated Damage and the Arrest of Johnathan Seacat

With the coming of dawn, it became apparent that another entry would likely be necessary in order to arrest the suspect. A deliberate decision was made to open up segments of the building's exterior in an attempt to locate Seacat, while providing a greater level of safety for entry team personnel. Two large explosive charges were used to create breaches that opened sight lines through exterior upstairs walls, and a boom on an armored vehicle was utilized to tear open segments of the exterior where Seacat was believed to be hiding. At one point, Commander Varney authorized the team to "take as much of the building as needed, without making the roof fall.'

At 8:26 am, after eliminating significant elements of the structure from the exterior, an entry team consisting of personnel from Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office SWAT was eventually able to enter and locate Seacat in an upstairs bathroom. Seacat, who was still armed, continued to resist and struggle until overpowered and secured by deputies. He was alive and relatively unharmed by law enforcement but would suffer severe medical complications from his massive ingestion of methamphetamine.

The incident had lasted nearly nineteen hours but the work of crime scene processing, damage assessment and cleanup were just beginning, as were the questions that prompted this report.

Analysis

As representatives of the National Tactical Officer's Association, we are obviously strong proponents of the SWAT concept for domestic law enforcement. Nonetheless, we would also be the first to point out that many law enforcement agencies are unwilling to make the necessary commitment and therefore have no business fielding a SWAT team. The decision to maintain a SWAT team carries with it tremendous responsibility. It is neither easy nor inexpensive to properly select, train, maintain, equip and deploy SWAT personnel in conformance with best standards and practices.

During our interactions with Chief Jackson and his personnel, we were uniformly impressed with their commitment, professional deportment, candor, and desire to receive critical feedback on their performance. Equally impressive, were the overwhelmingly positive comments we received from members of every other agency we interviewed, regarding their assessment of the Greenwood Village Police Department (GVPD) SWAT team. It is readily apparent that GVPD SWAT regularly trains with and supports their allied agencies. They have developed an exceptional rapport with surrounding agencies, which is critical to working together effectively during a crisis event. These relationships are particularly important given the limited personnel resources and operational tempo encountered by GVPD.

Working in concert with their counterparts from the Aurora Police Department (APD), the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office (ACSO) and the Douglas County Sheriff's Office (DCSO), they are able to field an impressive array of personnel and equipment. This interagency cooperation was a key component to the overall success of this operation.

Initial Response

When the first shot was fired by Seacat and it became apparent that this would be a barricaded suspect operation, the initial response was appropriate and generally impressive. Commander Varney stated his intent to assume command of the incident concurrent with the information that shots had been fired. Regardless of agency affiliation, all other personnel on scene apparently acquiesced to his authority.

Within minutes, inner and outer perimeters were in place and a field command post (CP) was established in the street, around the corner from the incident location. The C/P was properly out of line of sight from the target location, although it was arguably too close to the incident and somewhat restricted in size for the staging of significant incoming assets.

Within thirty minutes of the initial shot, an arrest team had been placed, Fire Department / Emergency Medical Service assets had responded to the C/P, and a Unified Command was established with GVPD, APD, and Fire Department commanders. By this time, negotiations with the suspect were also well underway. Within the first hour, the Red Cross had been contacted to aid residents who had been displaced by

evacuations. Based upon our review of these actions, there is little more that could be asked in terms of the initial response to this incident.

Command and Control

As reported in the previous section, Commander Varney assumed command and established a viable field command post early in the incident. Whenever a critical incident involves responders from different agencies and/or disciplines, the establishment of a unified command with someone in authority to represent each assisting entity is absolutely imperative.

Commander Varney endeavored to achieve this very goal, and to a great degree he was successful in that effort. Even so, at times there can be too much of a good thing. Attempts to be too inclusive can result in an overcrowded command post, command by committee, and a loss of momentum that may be critical to seizing opportunities or maintaining an operational tempo that serves to put a suspect at a disadvantage.

During the course of our interviews, personnel told us that as the night wore on, the command post became increasingly crowded with non-essential personnel and decision-making was stymied by attempts to achieve consensus. At times, this problem was exacerbated when after a course of action had been determined, the Chief would arrive, intervene and place activities on hold until he was briefed and satisfied with the intended progression.

The circumstances just described are not only understandable, they are natural and to be expected. The commander in this case is extremely bright, well trained and committed but he lacks extensive experience in handling incidents of this type, so he sought consensus from his peers on other agencies. The Chief is ultimately responsible for the actions of his personnel and he answers directly to his constituents and city fathers, so he intervened until he was satisfied. Unfortunately, the process of seeking consensus from too many participants can cost valuable momentum, and excessive interventions from above can undermine the authority of the field commander and serve to make the Chief the de facto Incident Commander.

On a somewhat related note, the relatively small GVPD dispatch center experienced some of the same issues when well meaning but non-essential senior city personnel occupied it. This distraction occurred as dispatchers were engaged in monitoring and recording what took place at the incident scene, while simultaneously handling an overwhelming number of citizen inquiries related to the incident.

Effective command and dispatch centers must be cleared of all non-essential personnel during a critical incident. While it may go against the grain to tell well-intended people they must step outside, it must be done.

While the Chief of Police certainly has the authority to step in and assume incident command at any time, he should do so only if he intends to remain in the command post and exercise that authority continuously. A reasonable alternative that may serve to

alleviate these concerns would be for the Chief to gather interested senior city officials with him in an adjacent location, while completely empowering his commander to wield incident command. This would be done with the understanding that the commander also has a duty to provide periodic updates to the Chief via phone as circumstances permit.

Finally, we highly recommend the utilization of a Radioman / Scribe for the incident commander during these types of events. This person's primary function would be to monitor the radio for the incident commander while he is engaged in conversation, and to keep a detailed log of all activities and any additional information the incident commander deems worthy of recording. During this event, an incident log was maintained by dispatchers, but it fails to capture many relevant details that otherwise must be searched for in a myriad of reports.

Escalation

Negotiations

It is important to begin any discussion of escalation by noting that active negotiations were an integral part of the initial effort to resolve this incident, and that after the suspect hung up on officers, attempts to re-establish a dialogue continued all through the night and through the use of various tactical alternatives such as the introduction of chemical munitions.

There is a common misconception that tactics and negotiations are mutually exclusive endeavors. Nothing could be (or at least should be) further from the truth. After all, no suspect would have any incentive to negotiate unless he first found himself at a tactical disadvantage. Based upon our interviews and our review of after-action documents, it is clear that GVPD commanders and members of the SWAT team all have a great deal of respect for their negotiations component (CNT), which was well used during this event.

Unfortunately, at one point there was a miscommunication when the command element authorized cutting off the suspect's cell service without first notifying the CNT supervisors. Fortunately, the involved negotiators were notified of the plan directly from the command element, but the supervisors should have been involved in the decision-making process and the flow of information. This appears to be a non-deliberate lack of coordination, which should be resolved as a training issue. Overall CNT response should also be bolstered by providing updated computer capabilities and ensuring internet access at the field command post.

Chemical Munitions

When it became apparent that the suspect was refusing to re-engage negotiators, a very deliberate and measured escalation of tactical alternatives was employed over a period of several hours. Altogether, (68) 40mm (cold) chemical munitions rounds were deployed into the residence as opposed to just (4) hot gas munitions that were deployed on the lower floors. Apparently, there was a very small inventory of (hot) gas munitions

available. While there is no guarantee that a more substantial insertion of (hot) gas would prove effective, we are of the opinion that a more robust application of the munitions would have been advisable.

The employment of chemical munitions is one of those areas of endeavor where momentum can be very important. Once the decision is made to employ chemical munitions, the entire target should be saturated as soon as possible to achieve maximum effect. Otherwise, the suspect has the option to retreat to unaffected areas and make use of materials (i.e. towels) within the building to counter effects of the munitions.

Flash / Sound Diversionary Devices (Flashbangs)

As referenced in the Incident Synopsis, an attempt by entry team members to toss a flashbang onto the second floor landing went awry when the flashbang struck a railing and fell back down on the entry team. Unfortunately, this is not an uncommon event. However, it is a serious issue, as the errant throw could have resulted in major injuries to one of the officers. We recommend incorporating practice for this motor skill into team training.

Long-Rifle Communication Protocol

At one point after Seacat fired the second round of shots, the terms “Offensive” and “Defensive” were utilized by members of the command staff. This was done to convey a threat condition to long-rifle personnel. This is troublesome for two reasons. First, it is reminiscent of the antiquated “green light, red light” protocols in which long-rifle personnel were expected to take or pass on a shot based upon orders from their commander, rather than on their own understanding of threat conditions. Second, there seemed to be some confusion among personnel from other agencies as to the exact meaning of these phrases.

We strongly suggest that known threats and applicable intelligence be conveyed in plain English so all personnel have the information to independently make rational decisions regarding the use of deadly force.

The Employment of Calculated Destruction as a Tactic

A barricaded suspect is inherently dangerous because the barricade (in this case, a two story home) provides the suspect with a position of cover, concealment, and in most cases, some degree of control over the avenues of approach and entry into the location. Presumably, the suspect also possesses a greater familiarity with the location’s interior layout and hazards than the law enforcement personnel who must enter and search for him. These elements combine to offer significant tactical advantages to the suspect.

The majority of barricaded suspect incidents are resolved in one of the following ways:

- The suspect acquiesces to surrender demands after coming to the realization that escape is impossible and resistance will be futile.

- The suspect is apprehended after being forced from the location with chemical munitions.
- The suspect assumes a non-offensive posture and attempts to evade capture by secreting himself within a hiding place. In these instances, the suspect is usually apprehended by officers who enter and clear the structure methodically with the aid of tools such as pole cameras, robots and/or canines.

Suspects who assume an offensive posture and who appear to be immune to the effects of chemical agents present a special hazard and greatly limit the options available to law enforcement. Such suspects can pose a serious and ongoing threat not only to law enforcement personnel, but also to citizens in the surrounding area. These situations often require extreme measures for resolution, up to and including the application of deadly force.

In the case before us, Johnathan Seacat refused to negotiate, showed no response to the employment of chemical munitions and assumed an offensive posture, firing twice on law enforcement; once apparently from a position of ambush.

He was known to have access to multiple firearms including “hunting rifles.” (This later proved to be a shotgun.) His barricaded position in a two story structure provided him with a degree of high ground, making the homes, park and freeway in the surrounding area vulnerable to attack should he chose to do so.

After employing a painstaking escalation of negotiations and tactical options to include chemical munitions, diversionary devices, and small explosive breaching charges, all without positive effect; the command staff was compelled to examine other alternatives. In effect, they ultimately chose to remove pieces of the barricade from the barricaded suspect.

The preservation of property is always a consideration in these situations but in the final analysis, the command staff is compelled to answer a rather simple question: What are the relative values of lives versus property? In this case, a conscious decision was made to forfeit property in an attempt to avoid a close quarter confrontation that would in all probability result in the death of the suspect as well as a high likelihood of serious injury or death to one or more members of the entry team.

A decision of this type is not without precedent. Although rare for the city of Greenwood Village, incidents and resolutions similar to this take place on a relatively frequent basis. The controlled application of explosives to create a breach for entry or gun porting is a common tactic, as is the use of a boom on an armored vehicle to create a breach point, insert chemical munitions or to eliminate areas of cover and concealment for the suspect.

Commander Varney’s authorization to “take down as much of the building as needed, without making the roof fall in” was not given out of nonchalance, or some perverted desire to destroy a home. It was given in hopes of protecting the lives of personnel

under his command, as well as the life of the suspect, Johnathan Seacat. In all probability, Commander Varney's decision contributed substantially to that very result.

Conclusion

No tactical operation comes off without a hitch. Based upon our collective experience, we have endeavored to identify several aspects of the response to this incident that could be improved upon. Fortunately, most of these concerns are minor in nature.

Apart from the few issues referenced in this report, we believe that the personnel engaged in this operation acted in a highly commendable manner, and that the overall result of their performance was a resounding success. This remains true, notwithstanding the regrettable damage and loss of property that was incurred by the homeowner. While this blameless homeowner has our sincere sympathy for his loss and inconvenience, he can at least be compensated for and recover from his loss. In contrast, no amount of money can compensate family members and friends for the loss of a loved one.

A committed, armed and barricaded opponent is a serious force to be reckoned with. Jonathan Seacat was a heavily armed and assaultive adversary who chose to use an innocent homeowner's residence as a position of advantage to use against pursuing officers.

During the course of this event, the combined law enforcement personnel under the command of GVPD acted in a professional manner, and in substantial accordance with best practice and standards. The performance of GVPD personnel was particularly impressive, given the minimal frequency of their actual SWAT activations. They patiently employed a measured escalation of tactical alternatives over the course of many hours, while continually attempting to re-establish contact with the suspect in hopes of resuming negotiations. In the final analysis, the law enforcement personnel engaged in this operation accomplished their mission safely, while demonstrating considerable restraint and a commendable reverence for human life.

About the Reviewers

Don Kester

Don Kester is the Director of Training and Education for the National Tactical Officer's Association (NTOA). Prior to his employment with the NTOA, Don served with the Pima County (AZ) Sheriff's Department for over 23 years, retiring at the rank of Captain.

Mr. Kester has extensive experience in the field of tactical operations and critical incident command. Don served his department at all ranks as a SWAT member and as the Tactical Response Section Commander, he was responsible for oversight of many special operations personnel including the SWAT unit, K-9 Unit, Aviation unit, and Bomb Squad. During the course of his career, Don has supervised or commanded hundreds of high-risk critical incidents.

Mr. Kester has been as an instructor for the National Tactical Officer's Association (NTOA) continually since 2000, and he served as an elected member of the Association's Board of Directors from 2007-2014. In 2015, he accepted the full-time position of Director of Training and Education for the Association.

Don has completed SWAT team reviews for several law enforcement agencies. He is a court-qualified expert in the areas of SWAT, use of force, defensive tactics, less-lethal munitions, electronic control devices and chemical munitions. He has also served on Arizona POST Subject Matter Expert Committees in the areas of Defensive Tactics and Law & Legal (Use of Force).

Mr. Kester holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Business Administration from the University of Arizona, and is a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

Phil Hansen

Phil Hansen assumed the role of Commander with the Santa Maria Police Department in 2013. He is responsible the department's Patrol Division, encompassing all aspects of patrol operations, traffic enforcement, SWAT, and departmental training at large. Prior to his employment with Santa Maria PD, Phil served with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) for 36 years, retiring at the rank of Captain.

The great majority of Phil's law enforcement service is in the field of tactical operations and critical incident command. This includes over 13 years as a full-time SWAT sergeant /entry team leader, and 6 years as the SWAT lieutenant /team commander at LASD's Special Enforcement Bureau (SEB).

While with the LASD, Phil also served as a lieutenant at the department's Emergency Operations Bureau. In this capacity he was responsible for large event planning, regional law enforcement mutual aid, and department-wide response to critical incidents

such as civil disturbances and wild-land fires. In this capacity, he also oversaw sections of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group. (Now the Joint Regional Intelligence Center)

Commander Hansen has been an instructor for the National Tactical Officer's Association (NTOA) since 1991 and has been on that Association's Board of Directors continuously for over 22 years, serving as Chairman of the Board for 5 years. In 2013 he was named a Director Emeritus.

Phil has completed major tactical incident reviews and SWAT capability assessments for several agencies. He has served on special Boards of Inquiry for the Los Angeles and Oakland Police Departments in the wake of highly publicized fatal shootings involving SWAT personnel. Phil is a recognized subject matter expert in the area of law enforcement tactical operations and has served on several course development committees for the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST). As a member of the California POST Executive Committee on SWAT, he was instrumental in the development of the current California POST SWAT Guidelines.

Commander Hansen holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Business Administration from California State University, Northridge, and a Master's Degree in Leadership from the University of Southern California.